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This
is a briefing paper on the Department for Culture, Media and
Sport Sec. Teresa Jowell’s proposal to abolish the BBC
(British Broadcasting Company) Board of Governors and replace
it with a Board of Trust and an Executive Board which will
be doing the two separate tasks the governors formerly did-1.
managing the company; 2. maintaining accountability to the
licence-paying public. The Secretary’s Green Paper maintained
that, though the BBC is still one of the most trusted and
liked entities in Britain, in light of certain controversies,
e.g. the suicide of Dr. David Kelly and the ensuing Lord Hutton
report, and because of the clamour by the public, it is now
high time to reform the company (Green Paper 2005). Jowell
furthered that there was conflict of interest on the way the
governors did their job. While the latter were responsible
to see to it that the BBC is accountable to the public, they
were also in charge of its management and all the concerns
attached to it, not excluding profits.
The
reasons posed by Sec. Jowell may be in the correct perspective.
Yet, a cursory glance at the Green Paper would show how the
proposed changes may be too shallow. For the Board of Governors
to be abolished and replaced by two bodies doing its former
tasks separately would seem to open up a lot of questions
on influence and conflict of interests- the very same issues
brought up on the governors. While separating the tasks into
two bodies would seem logical, the question arises whether
the BBC Board of Trust could really manage to control, or
even direct the Executive Board to tailor the various BBC
programmes according to public clamour and interest.
This
paper aims to explore the nuances and vicissitudes of the
British broadcasting system. It will focus upon BBC and its
unique role as a publicly-funded yet autonomous government
media company. The main purpose will be to look upon the rationale
behind the proposed changes as contained in the Green Paper
and analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments
presented. In the end, the paper will endeavor to compare
the pros and cons of replacing the Board of Governors.
Introduction
The
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has come along way
since its inception by Royal charter in 1927. Since then,
it has been one of the largest media company in the world
with TV, radio and internet programmes and broadcasts (Wikipedia
n.d.). On domestic television, its services include BBC One,
BBC Two, and the news channel BBC News 24. In the international
arena, BBC maintains a BBC World Service radio and a television
co-managed with the British Foreign Office. At home, its radio
programs include Radio 1 and radio 4.
Funding
comes mainly from licence. This comes in the form of annual
television tax to British citizens. It also gets a chunk of
its revenues from commercial advertising and from its international
sales of its catalogue of programs. Though in theory, the
BBC is accountable to the licence-paying public, its additional
revenue-generating schemes make it less so.
Since
its inception in 1927, the BBC has been run by a board of
governors put in place by the current government. Before,
the board held the position for as long as five years. Now,
it has a term of four years. The management of the organization
is put into the hands of the Director-General who is chosen
by the members of the Board. The latter, meanwhile, are given
the dual task of making the company accountable to the licence-payees-
the public- while managing its affairs as a corporation.
Controversies- The Roots of the Jowell
Proposal
Theoretically,
the BBC is public-owned. Thus, it should be accountable only
to the British public and remain neutral in partisan issues.
However, history is full of charges and counter-charges of
the company siding with the opposition, or abetting the incumbent
government. Because the members of the Board of Governors
are appointed by the government, accusations of bias may stem
from these appointments. Too, commercial advertisements have
been at the forefront of the company since its inception.
Sparks
(1995) posits that the British broadcasting industry has been
governed by culturalist ideas. This rests on the assumption
that broadcasting, but most especially TV, should be grounded
on serving the public and not on commercial grounds. From
1927 to 1954, the BBC monopolized television broadcasting.
The 1954 television Act finished it by allowing commercially-funded
programming, the very first in the UK. This opened up a whole
array of competition strategies for new entrants. Popular
entertainment shows were introduced, as well as changing the
aspects of news and drama delivery to be attuned with advertisement
ways (Sparks 1995, p.142).
With
the proliferation of TV laden with commercials, it was imminent
that the public, having been used to the BBC monopoly of advertisement-free
shows would react negatively. The government saw it prudent
to form a Committee on Broadcasting to do a study on commercialized
broadcasting. It concluded that the role of commercialized
TV is “to provide a service of television broadcasting
which will realise as fully as possible the purposes of broadcasting"
( Pilkington Committee, 1962 , p. 166 cited in Sparks 1995).
While advertising was inevitable, the report became critical
on how TV broadcasting was being debased. It proposed strengthening
of the regulatory authority so as to contain the negative
impact of commercialization. On funding, the report offered
that the licence system stay while advertisements the amount
“certainly should not be increased . . . and…further
reduced" (ibid., p. 84 cited in Sparks).
Results
in legislation were substantial. BBC was given its second
station while the powers of the regulatory authority, then
the Independent Television Authority (ITA) were increased.
The committee eschewed a competitive commercial sector. The
general opinion of the Pilkington (Sir Harry Pilkington headed
it) Committee was that increased commercialization would ruin
the quality of broadcasting which primarily aimed for the
good of the public (Ibid Sparks, p.144). What emerged was
a competition between public and private or commercial broadcasters
in the most minimal sense. The quality of service overrode
revenue considerations
The
1970s opened up with yet again another committee tasked to
carry out a study in view of the entry of a fourth TV channel.
Its concern drew from its precedent- commercialization should
be strictly limited. The Annan Committee, as it was called,
stressed that broadcasting should be designed in a manner
which eschews competition for diversity and specialization
in terms of services or source of funding. It recommended
the formation of a governing body, the Open Broadcasting Authority,
which would manage competition between the different commercial
companies. This was not, however, adapted by Parliament.
Another
issue debated on the British broadcasting system was on culture
or nationality. Given that the UK was composed of different
nationalities, the English nature of the system was increasingly
being questioned. As Annan said, "Our society's culture
is now multiracial and pluralist. . . . The structure of broadcasting
should reflect this variety" (ibid., p. 30 cited in Sparks).
Results included the setting up of a Welsh language channel,
the Sianel Sianel Pedwar Cymru.
Despite
the attacks on culturalist values, policy-makers continued
to defend the British broadcasting set-up. It was most critical
of the American set-up which it saw as of low quality and
non-values oriented. Protectionism was the byword. And though
the state refused to yield to calls for rejection of overseas
shows, it strongly commented that the foreign programmes should
be of quality, at available price, and designed consciously
for the British audience (Ibid Sparks, p. 146).
The
onset of the 1980s saw a general reversal of protectionist
policies. Almost all public utilities like telecommunications,
gas, electricity, and water were privatized, as well as the
nationalized industries of oil, coal, motors and steel. The
control over currency was ended. Broadcasting was not spared.
The Peacock Committee, the third since Pilkington, was tasked
"To assess the effects of the introduction of advertising
or sponsorship on the BBC's Home Services" (Peacock Committee,
1986, p. 1 cited in Sparks p. 148). As concurrent with the
government’s ideology, the Committee put the BBC in
the line of free-market economics. Though the abolishing of
the licence was eschewed, it stated that the BBC might have
to consider other fund-generating ventures other than the
licence fee. This was a departure from the two previous committees
in that theoretical models of economics were explicitly utilized
(Ibid Sparks).
The
committee proposed a subscription mode on channels. This would
serve the purpose of giving consumers what they want while
profits could be earned. The Peacock Committee’s report
was translated into the 1990 Broadcsasting Act. This centered
on the regulation of commercial TV. In here, it was clear
that culturalist notions still stayed. It was a clearly a
compromise between the economic and cultural as the market
was further opened up while stressing the role of television
as serving the cultural tastes of the public. The Independent
Television Committee (ITC) expressed concern over the quality
of programs introduced with the opening up of the market.
It
was in 1995 that debates about the status of the BBC as a
public-owned company surfaced. The 1992 Green Paper sparked
the debate with its concern over the BBC lagging behind foreign
competitors on revenues needed for. The paper stressed BBC’s
tasks: "informing the national debate" by the provision
of high-quality news and current affairs programs; sustaining
a fairly elitist definition of the national culture, particularly
through drama productions; carrying out an educational role
for the whole of society; and "communicating between
the UK and abroad" (BBC, 1992, pp. 19-23). Since then,
the debate has grown especially with the launching of the
BBC World Wide and since it launched its satellite. To grow,
the BBC has to be freed from “the regulatory burden
they labour” in order to grow (Andrea Wonfor, Joint
Managing Director of Granada Television cited in Maddox 1995,
p. 10).
The Government’s Role- At Present
Increased
liberalization and the opening up of markets have seem to
decrease the role of the state. In particular, the British
state has been on the defensive in its role on the BBC. This
would seem to show a new era of non-government involvement
in broadcasting.
However,
trends have been on the government side. First, before, the
BBC Board of Governors were chosen by the main parties and
these men and women were thought to be within the bounds of
consensus. This has been changing (Doornaert & Omdal 1989;
Greenwood & Welsh 1992). Governments have been putting
individuals who were there because of loyalty and not because
of their acumen or skill (Barnett & Curry, 1994; O'Malley,
1994). These party soldiers have influenced the directions
of the company including its personnel. The company thus,
had the tendency to become captive to the whims of whatever
incumbent government was. This opens up a lot of avenues for
the Opposition to charge the BBC of bias. It is a two-way
street however. The Government, through the 1990s and most
recently in 2004 became critical of the way BBC reported about
the war in Iraq. The suicide of David Kelly called for a legislative
inquiry headed by Lord Hutton. The Hutton Report showed how
BBC personnel erred on their reporting. This caused the resignation
of BBC Chairman Gavyn Davies and made way for Sec. Jowell’s
recommendations. The third reason why the government has been
encroaching back into broadcasting is the putting up of a
censor body, the Broadcasting Standards Council (BSC), though
its has not yet involved itself in politics.
The Green Paper- Pros and Cons
With
this backgrounder on the British broadcasting system, we can
now proceed to analyzing the arguments behind why or why not
a content of the Green Paper-here, specifically abolishing
the Board of Governors and replacing it with the BBC Trust
and an Executive Board- bodes well for the British people.
Is this beneficial for the British people? Sec. Jowell’s
proposal can be understood in the light of the recent controversies
which occurred between the BBC and the current government.
First, the BBC came neutral in reporting about the war. While
Blair was explicit in supporting the American invasion of
Europe, the BBC kept a neutral, sometimes even critical view
of it especially with the involvement of British troops. What
drove the wedge between the two was the report of BBC reporter
Andrew Gilligan which told of how the government “sexed-up”
intelligence materials to justify the invasion of Iraq. This
resulted to the suicide of David Kelly, the purported leak
from the government and the ensuing Hutton Inquiry which castigated
BBC management and Gilligan for the report. This would cause
the resignation of top-level BBC officials including the Chair
Gavyn Davies, Director General Greg Dyke, and Gilligan himself.
The
proposal to break down the Board of Governors into two distinct
bodies, from a functional point of view, may be a wise move.
The division of labour would make the two bodies work more
effectively. The task of the BBC Trust is to oversee the corporation
– with responsibility for the licence fee and for making
sure the BBC fulfils its public service obligations. The Executive
Board, meanwhile, is responsible for delivering the BBC's
services within a framework set by the Trust.
Indeed,
at first glance, the rationale behind the separation seems
valid. Division of labor enables each body to concentrate
fully on its task/s. While the BBC Trust takes care of the
licence fee and for making sure the BBC fulfils its public
service obligations, the Executive Board is responsible for
delivering the BBC's services within a framework set by the
Trust. The main problems here are the issues of independence
and influence. Are the two bodies co-equal? If yes, then there
is the tendency for the Executive Board not to heed the Trust’s
guidelines or even impose upon the latter what framework they
would want to work with. Co-equality would mean each body
would not easily give up its independence. The Trust is supposed
to issue guidelines for the Executive Board to follow. Are
there assurances that the latter will heed?
Structure
and accountability are other pertinent matters addressed in
the Green Paper. This may be the area of the proposal’s
strength. The lack of clarity in the role of the governors
has made the BBC very vulnerable to government intervention,
as the Hutton Report would show. If the Executive Board is
explicitly stated as accountable to the Trust, then there
would be no problem. Of course the Executive Board would be
accountable to Parliament but this would be again a very different
story. A majority government would mean the Trust would be
exposed to the predilections of he politicians. A more consensual
one would bode well for the company and the public as well.
On the downside of it, dividing the governors’ tasks
would mean more people. More people would entail an increase
in expenses. Thus the plan, without a conscious cost-benefit,
may hurt BBC’s finances.
Conclusion
The
BBC is on its crossroads. In 2006, it will have a new Charter.
As a precursor to the expected company overhaul, the Department
for Culture, Media and Sport last March 2005 has issued a
Green Paper detailing some changes on the way BBC will be
managed. Though less authoritative than a White Paper, the
Green Paper serves as a blueprint to guide future changes.
Indeed,
the BBC has come a long way. From its inception in 1923 to
its Chartering in 1927 as a publicly-owned company, to the
deregulation of the broadcasting industry in the 1980s, it
has been through major changes in British history. It is no
wonder why the people in the United Kingdom are proud of this
major player in broadcasting, local and international. Controversies,
however, have sullied the company’s reputation. Primary
are the accusations of bias thrown by both the government
and the opposition regarding the treatment of news. Indeed,
the rationale behind Sec. Jowell’s Green Paper is that
those managing BBC were torn between two quite opposing tasks-
managing the business affairs of the company while seeing
to it that the interests of the main shareholders- the licence-paying
public- are protected.
The
prescription of the Green Paper over the oft-spoken “conflict
of interest” in the governing board- giving the two
major tasks to two separate bodies- needs further analysis
and clarifications. Indeed, dividing labour may look effective.
Yet, is it efficient? Too, the Green Paper reads more like
the re-phrasing of an essay. The changes seem too shallow,
too cosmetic. How sure will it be that the Executive Board
will heed the Trust’s guidelines? Due credit, however,
should be given to the creators of the green paper. As a start
for an overhaul of the BBC, it does not look too bad. The
advise is to refine it, including giving the Trust real power
over the Executive Board. Politics should not water down the
reforms. It should not be about the Whigs or the Tories. It
should be improving the BBC to make it more responsible and
responsive to its customers- the people of the UK.
References:
Barnett, S., & Curry, A. ( 1994 ). The Battle for the
BBC. London: Aurum Press.
BBC Charter Review: The green paper (n.d.)
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). http://www.bbccharterreview.org.uk/.
BBC News UK Edition (March 2, 2005). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3434661.stm
BBC-Wikipedia (n.d.) www.mvlife.com/mv/mvlife_wiki/bb/BBC.html
Doornaert, M., & Omdal, S. E. ( 1989
). Press freedom under attack in Britain. Brussels, Belgium:
International
Federation of Journalists
Greenwood, W., & Welsh, T. ( 1992 ).
McNae's essential law for journalists. London: Butterworth
Maddox, B. ( 1995, March 30 ). End to "regulatory
burden" on media groups urged. The Financial Times,
p. 10.
O'Malley, T. ( 1994 ). Closedown? The BBC
and government broadcasting policy, 1979-92. London: Pluto
Press
Sparks, C. (1995). The survival of the state
in British broadcasting. Journal of Communication, vol. 45.
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